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I. INTRODUCTION
When discussing "constitutional rights" there is a tendency to think only of
the first eight amendments to the United States Constitution. Many believe that
those provisions alone are sufficient to secure and protect the freedoms of
speech, religion, and the press. A second important source of protection exists
that is often overlooked-the Ohio Constitution.
What happens when the rights and protections contained in the Ohio
Constitution are violated? Is there, for example, any remedy under the Ohio
Constitution for an Ohio citizen unlawfully seized? Are there any
constitutional remedies for the police officer or college professor demoted in
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rank or status simply because she publicly disagreed with the point of view
expressed by her superiors? Can a citizen, alleging violations of the Ohio
Constitution, bring an action for damages based solely upon the violation of a
right guaranteed under the Ohio Constitution?
Consider the case of Parker Jeffries,1 decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio
in its December 1842 term. Mr. Jeffries had a father of European descent and a
mother of both Indian and African descent.2 Some time before the initiation of
the suit, Mr. Jeffries attempted to cast his ballot in an election, but those
stationed at the polling place did not allow him to vote because they believed
that he was a "person of color."3 In an effort to prove that he was eligible to vote,
Mr. Jeffries produced his credentials. 4 His attempt at persuasion failed and
Jeffries walked away from the poll.5 Having had his constitutionally
guaranteed right to vote denied him and having seen his opportunity to
exercise his right pass with the closing of polls on election day, Jeffries was faced
with a decision: do nothing and wait for the next election where the above
scenario would perhaps again play itself out or, in the alternative, seek redress
from those who had wrongfully denied him the exercise of his constitutionally
protected right. Jeffries opted to turn to the courts for protection, filing an action
for damages against those who had denied him the right to vote.6
The trial court found that Jeffries had been wrongfully denied the exercise
of his right to vote and awarded him damages of six cents.7 On appeal before
the supreme court, Chief Justice Lane proclaimed that this "damages" remedy
should be permitted.8 Admitting that "no suit [generally] lies against an officer,
for a mistake in the exercise of his judicial discretion[,]" 9 the court looked
beyond this general rule and concluded that "when we reflect upon how highly
the privilege of voting is generally valued, and that the legislature has
provided, and the forms of law admit no other remedy than this action, we
1Jeffries v. Ankeny, 11 Ohio 372 (1842). For a case similar in nature and reaching
the same conclusion, see Anderson v. Millikin, 9 Ohio St. 568 (1859).
2Jeffries, 11 Ohio at 372.
31d. at 374.
41d.
5Id.
611 Ohio at 374. The right to the franchise was guaranteed to Mr. Jeffries under OHIO
CONST. art. 4, § 1. His complaint against the defendants was grounded solely upon a
violation of the rights guaranteed him therein. Id.
71d. at 373.
81d. at 374.
91d.
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unite in the opinion, that a necessity exists for entertaining this remedy."10
Judgment was entered for Jeffries. 11
The Jeffries decision is significant in determining whether a cause of action
can be maintained against those who violate rights contained in the Ohio
Constitution. While few would argue that the Jeffries decision lacks logical
grounding or that awarding damages was somehow unjust or unfounded, the
principle for which the Jeffries decision stands, i.e. that violations of the Ohio
Constitution warrant a recovery of damages, has been ignored. Given the
number of other "highly valued" rights12 contained in Ohio's Constitution, one
could reasonably conclude that the courts, especially in the absence of
legislative action, would have invoked their remedy powers to allow a cause
of action for violations of those rights as well. Ohio's courts, however, have
thus far failed to do so.
The reasons for the courts' failure to allow the cause of action are not easily
found. Some would argue the "ever-expanding" role of the United States
Constitution as protector of individual rights, when combined with the Civil
Rights Act,13 has permitted litigators to focus almost exclusively upon the
protections afforded under federal law, to the detriment of the protections
afforded under state law.14 However, while a Section 1983 action provides a
powerful tool in helping to prevent violations of constitutional rights, and
Section 1983 actions do provide the aggrieved with a vehicle for the collection
of damages as a result of those constitutional violations, one must always be
cognizant of the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal law meant to protect and
compensate for violations of the United States Constitution.15 Its applicability
to violations of the Ohio Constitution is nonexistent.
The emergence of the Section 1983 action over the past thirty years cannot
explain why the "damages" rationale in Jeffries has not been applied to the Ohio
Constitution's numerous other protections16-nearly one-hundred and fifty
years have passed since Jeffries and the Ohio Supreme Court has yet to declare
that there can be a damage award for violations of any other provisions of the
Ohio Constitution.
lOjeffries, 11 Ohio at 374.
111d.
12 For example, the freedoms of speech and press contained in OHIO CONST. art. I,
§ 11; the freedom of religion contained in OHIO CoNsT. art. I, § 7; and the freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure contained in OHIO CONsT. art. 1, §14.
1342 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
14 See Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bill of Rights Claims, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1269, 1273 (1985) (acknowledging that where "federal substantive law is as protective
as the state law, state claims will be disfavored if the federal remedy offers a 'better'
defendant, higher damages, enhanced access to attorney's fees, or some other advantage
unrelated to the merits of the claim.").
15 d. at 1270 n.3.
16 See supra note 12.
1995]
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The time has come to revisit the Jeffries rationale and declare that Ohio's
constitutional protections require enforcement, that those who suffer from
violations of the Ohio Constitution have a vehicle to remedy the wrong, and
that a cause of action arising directly from the constitutional violation will not
only enforce and give meaning to the protections in the Ohio Bill of Rights, but
will provide the remedy required to make whole the aggrieved party.
Several Ohio decisions over the past years provide hope for a resurrection
of the ideal proclaimed in Jeffiies.17 The purpose of this note is to show that
those decisions, together with Ohio's longstanding "right-to-a-remedy"
doctrine, 18 have moved Ohio close to proclaiming that violations of the Ohio
Constitution give rise to a cause of action against the violator.
This note will explain why Ohio's Constitution should be looked to as the
source of meaningful 19 remedy when its provisions are violated. I will
demonstrate that a cause of action grounded upon a violation of the Ohio
Constitution is not only meaningful, but necessary to the notion of
constitutional rights. Section two will briefly discuss the necessity of allowing
a cause of action to arise from a violation of the Ohio Constitution. In particular,
I will discuss the independence of the Ohio Constitution; the federal courts'
increasing hostility toward the vindication of federal constitutional rights; and
the benefit of allowing the aggrieved a choice, with respect to the vindication
of his constitutional rights, between remedies offered under federal law and
those afforded under Ohio law.
Section three will look at the example provided in both North Carolina and
Maryland. Of note, this section will reflect the rationale provided by those
states that have recognized a cause of action for damages arising directly from
violations of their respective state constitutions.
Section four will discuss the means by which Ohio's courts could permit the
constitutional cause of action. This analysis will involve a discussion of the
nature of constitutional rights, the courts' remedy-crafting power articulated
17Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio 1994); Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 594 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1992); and
Brennamen v. R.MI. Company; Bechtel Group, Inc., 639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994)
(expressly overruling Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co., 551 N.E.2d 938 (Ohio 1990)).
18 See OHIO CoNsT. art. , §16 proclaiming that "[ajll courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without delay." See
also Hardy v. VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626, 628 (Ohio 1987)("the language in the
Constitution is clear and leaves little room for maneuvering. Our courts are open to
those seeking remedy for injury to person, property, or reputation); Finley v. Kline, 557
N.E.2d 853, 855 (Ohio C.P. 1988)("in administering justice, courts should render
decisions which recognize and protect each litigant's rights, thus assuring each litigant
access to the justice system and allowing each his day in court.").
19An existence of a remedy does not, ipsofacto, end the analysis. The remedy must
be meaningful. See Gaines v. Preterm Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio
1988)(finding that the denial of a remedy and the denial of a meaningful remedy lead
to the same result, an injured party without a legal remedy).
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in article one, section sixteen of the Ohio Constitution, the doctrine of self-
execution, and a discussion of recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions dealing
with the "right-to-a-remedy" doctrine.
Section five will discuss the Ohio Supreme Court's one modem encounter
with the concept of allowing a cause of action to arise directly from a violation
of the Ohio Constitution-Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental Retardation and
Developmental Disabilities.20 This section will discuss the logic and reasoning
used by the Court and will examine the impact the decision will have on
allowing a cause of action to exist for constitutional violations.
Lastly, section six will address potential impediments, both constitutional
and statutory, to permitting a cause of action to arise directly from a violation
of the Ohio Constitution.21
II. WHY REVISIT THE Jeffries RATIONALE?
Since the Jeffries decision, Ohio's courts have not held that a cause of action
should lie against those who violate citizens' constitutional rights. The issue of
awarding damages for violations of state constitutional rights has never been
squarely addressed in modern Ohio courts. Developments in federal
constitutional law as well as the fundamental principles of sovereignty,
suggest that the time has come to reexamine the idea that damages should
follow from a violation of one's state constitutional rights in Ohio.
In our modem federal system, where heavy emphasis is placed more on the
actions of the federal government, one must still remember that Ohio is a
sovereign state and the Ohio Constitution is a document of "independent
force,"22 apart from the United States Constitution. The two separate
documents, co-existing in the federal relationship, often protect the same
liberties and rights.23 The degree of protection afforded under each, however,
may differ.
In those situations where the federal constitution applies to the actions of
the state of Ohio, and the Ohio Constitution protects the same rights as the
federal constitution, Ohio courts, when interpreting the Ohio Constitution,
must provide at least as much protection as the United States Supreme Court
has provided when interpreting United States Constitution provisions similar
or identical to those contained in the Ohio Constitution.24 Ohio is unrestrained,
however, in according "greater civil liberties and protections to individuals and
20594 N.E.2d 959.
21 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745 (Baldwin 1989).
22 Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, syllabus 1l1 (Ohio 1993).
23 Compare, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 11 (free speech and freedom of press) with U.S.
CONST. amend. I; compare OHIO CONST. art. 1, §14 (prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures and requiring probable cause to issue arrest warrant) with U.S. CoNsT.
amend. IV.
24616 N.E.2d 163, syllabus.
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groups" 25 under Ohio's Bill of Rights than would ordinarily be provided for
under the federal Bill of Rights. In other words, the federal Bill of Rights
furnishes a floor below which Ohio cannot fall when providing protection of
civil liberties. 26 Ohio is free, however, to provide any degree of protection so
long as it does not submerge below that floor.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has acknowledged that the Ohio Bill of Rights
has "undiminished vitality."27 In recognizing the "undiminished vitality"
concept, the various state courts in general, and the Ohio courts in particular,
have a duty "to independently interpret and apply"28 their own state
constitutions. By turning to the protections afforded under the Ohio
Constitution and enforcing those protections, Ohio will grant the proper
respect due to its own legal foundations, fulfill its sovereign duties, and
develop a body of independent jurisprudence in determining how and when
the Ohio Constitution will be applied.29
Equally as important, recognizing a cause of action arising from a violation
of the Ohio Constitution will refocus attention on Ohio's own independent
constitution. No longer will the litigator look solely to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when
faced with a violation of a constitutionally protected right.30 She will also look
to a body of law developed in Ohio's courts.
This prediction seems likely to come true given the United States Supreme
Court's increasingly hostile attitude toward the vindication of federal
constitutional rights. 31 This hostility can be seen through the Court's
limitations on the avenues of redress available to those whose federal
constitutional rights have been infringed. 32 As evidence to support this claim,
some point to the fragmented, contentious, impermanent and
methodologically simplistic opinions33 issued by the Court since 1977. More-
251d. See also State ex rel. The Repository v. Unger, 504 N.E.2d 37, 41 (Ohio
1986)(Celebrezze, C.J., concurring).
26See, e.g., Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 38 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ohio
1941).
2 71d. at 73.
28State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353, 359 (Wash. 1984).
29Id.
30This scenario applies only in those situations where a right is protected under both
the state and federal constitutions. See supra note 23.
3 1See Friesen, supra note 14, at 1271. See also Mindy L. McNew, Moresi: Protecting
Individual Rights Through the Louisiana Constitution, 53 LA. L. REV. 1641,1641 (1993).
32 McNew, supra note 31, at 1641.
33 David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1197 n.1 (1992).
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over, lower federal courts are increasingly likely to defer or deny federal claims
in favor of state remedies for the interest invaded.34
Revisiting and reinterpreting the Jeffries rationale in order to provide a state
remedy for violations of the Ohio Constitution would counteract the U.S.
Supreme Court's modem stance toward the vindication of constitutional
violations and, inevitably, the decision would provide an alternative to those
whose rights have been violated.35 Ohio would reassert and reaffirm its status
as a sovereign state, acknowledge its constitutional duty to protect the rights
of its citizens, and, in the absence of other remedies, provide a remedy for those
who have been wronged. In light of these benefits, the idea in Jeffries should be
resurrected and applied to our modem Ohio Constitution.
III. THE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTON--THER
STATE'S METHODS
Since a cause of action arising directly from the U.S. Constitution was first
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents Of The Federal Bureau Of Narcotics,36 numerous state courts have
borrowed the Supreme Court's reasoning and declared that violations of their
respective state constitutional guarantees can, without legislative
authorization, give rise to a cause of action against those who were involved
in the infringement. 37 In order to better understand the nature of the
34 Friesen, supra note 14, at 1271. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517
(1984)(denying Plaintiff's federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in favor of state
remedies).
35 To assert otherwise would lead to the illogical proposition that litigants will
continue to file in an increasingly hostile federal forum instead of moving to the
alternative, perhaps friendlier, state forum.
36403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Court, per Justice Brennan, stated that a violation of the
Fourth Amendment itself gives rise to a cause of action even without congressional
authorization for the action. Id. at 397-98. The Court reasoned that "where federally
protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts
will be alert to adjust their remedies soas to grant the necessary relief." Id. at 392 (quoting
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 684 (1946)). While the decision held great promise for the
vindication of those whose constitutional rights were violated, the Bivens' rationale has
been largely avoided by the Court. For an analysis of the Court's subsequent treatment
of the Bivens' principle, see Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled
Promise, 67 N.C. L. REV. 337 (1989).
3 7See, e.g. City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 873 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) rev'd,
896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1995); Corum v. University of North Carolina, 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985 (1992); Moresi v. Department of Wildlife and Fisheries,
567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990); Smith v. Department of Pub. Health, 410 N.W.2d 749 (Mich.
1987); Nelson v. Lane County, 720 P.2d 1291 (Or. 1986)(allowed common law claim
directly under the state's constitution, butheld claim was foreclosed by state's immunity
statute); Rockhouse Mountain Property Owner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Conway, 503
A.2d 1385 (N.H. 1986); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921 (Md. 1984);
Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, Inc., 459 N.E.2d 453 (Mass. 1983); Hunter v. Port Auth.
of Allegheny County, 419 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1980); Gay Law Students Ass'n et al. v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 389
1995]
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"constitutional cause of action" and determine how it could arise and be applied
in Ohio, a brief review of those states' decisions is warranted.
In 1992, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized for the first time that
a cause of action existed for violations of rights protected by the North Carolina
Constitution.38 In Corum v. University of North Carolina, the plaintiff, a tenured
college professor,39 was demoted from his position as Dean of Learning
Resources at Appalachian State University.40 Plaintiff Corum had publicly,
although peacefully, disagreed with his superior.41 Two days later and without
warning, Corum's superior removed him from his deanship.42 Dr. Corum
suspected that his dismissal from the deanship was based solely upon his
having publicly disagreed with his superior so, after having exhausted the
administrative remedies available to him,43 Corum brought suit against several
named defendants, including his superior at the university, alleging violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the right to free speech guaranteed him under the North
Carolina Constitution.44
The North Carolina Supreme Court, faced with the issue of whether Dr.
Corum could file suit claiming a violation of the free speech guarantee of the
North Carolina Constitution and, faced with the fact that no statute provided
for such a cause of action, had to determine if the claim for damages arising
from the constitutional violation could be advanced.45 At the onset of its
analysis, the court found that article one, section fourteen of the North Carolina
Constitution, North Carolina's freedom of speech guarantee, is a direct
personal guarantee of each citizen's right to freedom of speech 46 and, further,
that no legislation is required to make it effective.4 7 The court then invoked its
common-law "remedy-crafting" power by declaring that "the common law,
A.2d 465, 476 (N.J. 1978)(holding that state Supreme Court has the power to enforce
rights recognized by New Jersey Constitution even in the absence of implementing
legislation). For a more exhaustive list of states that have recognized a cause of action
in their state constitutions, see McNew, supra note 31, at 1655 n.12.
38413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985 (1992).
3 91d. at 280.
4 01d. at 280-81.
41Id.
4 2 Corum, 413 S.E.2d. at 282.
431d.
441d. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14 reads as follows: "Freedom of speech and of the press
are two of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but every
person shall be held responsible for their abuse."
45 See John D. Boutwell, Note, The Cause of Action for Damages Under North Carolina's
Constitution: Corum v. University of North Carolina, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1899, 1903 (1992).
46 Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 289.
47[d.
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which provides a remedy for every wrong, will furnish the appropriate action
for the adequate redress of a violation "48 of the right to free speech. Finding
freedom of speech to be "one of the fundamental cornerstones of
individual liberty and one of the great ordinances of our Constitution,"49 the
court held that "[a] direct action against the state for its violations of free speech
is essential to the preservation of free speech."50
Turning to the issue of whether the state actors involved could be liable for
damages as a result of the constitutional violations, the court answered in the
affirmative. 51 The court first found that the Declaration of Rights in the North
Carolina Constitution was adopted for the fundamental purpose of protecting
the rights articulated therein from encroachment by the state.52 This
encroachment, the court found, is accomplished '"by the acts of individuals who
are clothed with the authority of the State"53 and the "very purpose of the
Declaration of Rights is to ensure that the violation of these rights is never
permitted by anyone who might be invested under the Constitution with the
powers of the State."54 A state actor violating rights protected under the
Declaration of Rights, thereby contradicting the very purpose of those
provisions in the state constitution, would be liable in his official capacity for
damages resulting from those violations.55 Upholding this principle, the court
concluded that Dr. Corum could maintain an action for damages against his
superior, in his official capacity as an administrator at Allegheny State
University, for violations of Dr. Corum's constitutional right to free speech.5 6
The Maryland Court of Appeal's decision in Widgeon v. Eastern Shore
Hospital5 7 provides another example of the cause of action arising from a
violation of a state constitution. The plaintiff, John Widgeon, was involuntarily
admitted to Eastern Shore Hospital Center pursuant to a Petition for
Emergency Admission filed by Widgeon's wife.58 Upon arrival at the hospital,
two doctors examined Widgeon and did not find any outward signs of mental
disorder, as had been alleged by his wife.5 9 Nonetheless, the doctors ordered
48jd.
491d.
SCorum, 413 S.E.2d at 290.
5lid.
52 Id.
531d.
54Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 290 (citing State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144 (1838)).
5 51d.
56 Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 290.
57479 A.2d 921 (Md. 1984).
5 81d. at 922.
591d. at 922-23.
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him confined to the hospital.60 Widgeon, suspicious that his confinement was
nothing more than a scheme contrived by his wife, brought suit against the
hospital and other defendants alleging, inter alia, that his rights under the
Maryland Constitution 6l had been violated and for that he was entitled to
compensatory and/or punitive damages. 62
In response to a certified question to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the
state's high court declared that Maryland recognizes a common law action for
damages for violations of state constitutional rights.63 As a basis for its decision,
the court pointed to the existence of common law injunctive remedies for
unlawful searches and seizures64 as well as damage remedies for unlawful
takings.65 Using these two examples, the court argued that it need not imply
or create a new cause of action for constitutional violations, since the common
law recognized such claims. 66 The court reinforced its argument by pointing
to its ability to create remedies where none have been provided: "[iut has long
been held that where a statute establishes an individual right, imposes a
corresponding duty on the government, and fails to provide an express
statutory remedy, a traditional common law action will ordinarily lie."67
Therefore, a cause of action could be maintained based solely upon a violation
of a provision of the Maryland constitution.
These two decisions briefly described above, together with the Jeffries
decision described at the onset, serve to demonstrate that courts are
empowered to grant relief for those whose constitutional rights have been
violated, even in the absence of express statutory or constitutional provisions
providing that relief.68 While it is obvious from Jeffries that the Ohio Supreme
60Id. at 923.
61 The provisions of the Maryland Constitution which were allegedly violated are as
follows: 'That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold,
liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived
of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the
land." MARYLAND CONST. art. 24, and "That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to
search suspected places, or to seize anyperson or property, are grievous and oppressive;
and all general warrants to search suspected places or to apprehend suspected persons,
without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought
not to be granted." MARYLAND CONST. art. 26.
62 Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 923.
63 1d. at 922.
641d. at 925.
65 Widgeon, 479 A.2d at 929.
661d.
671d.
68 Other states have recognized that there can be relief even in the absence of statutory
or constitutional language explicitly providing such relief. Gay Law Students Ass'n, 595
P.2d at 602 n.10 ("the absence of... an administrative remedy, however, provides no
justification for the judiciary to fail to enforce individual rights under the state
[Vol. 43:459
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Court has invoked this judicial power in the past, it is the supreme court's
failure to invoke the doctrine for other constitutional violations that remains
an enigma. The ability to do so, however, remains as strong today as it was one-
hundred and fifty years ago.
IV. THE OHIO COURTS' ABILITY TO CREATE REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. The Nature of Rights as a Source of the Remedy-Crafting Power of the Courts
The ability of a court to create a remedy where none has been provided is
not a new concept.69 The Restatement of Torts (Second) describes this common
law doctrine as follows:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing
or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for
the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is
appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed
to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured
member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort
action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action. 0
While on its face Section 874(A) appears to apply only to acts of the legislature,
comment "a" to this section explicitly includes "constitutional provisions"
within the definition of "legislative provision."71
The inclusion of constitutional provisions within the "remedy-crafting"
doctrine might at first seem a bold declaration. Constitutions are not acts of the
legislature, but rather are established by the people. 72 An analysis of the nature
of "rights" demonstrates why Ohio's courts should allow a cause of action for
violations of constitutional rights, even when no remedies have been provided
by the legislature.
A legal right can be defined as "one that imposes a correlative duty on
another to act or refrain from acting for the benefit of the person holding that
Constitution"); Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co., 175 A.2d 639 (N.J. 1961)(there is no
need to have legislative implementation to afford an appropriate remedy to redress a
violation of rights); Phillips v. Youth Dev. Program, Inc., 459 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Mass.
1983)("[w]e would grant, however, that a person whose constitutional rights have been
interfered with maybe entitled to judicial relief even in the absence of a statute providing
a procedural vehicle for obtaining relief.").
6 9Friesen, supra note 14, at 1281.
70RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874(A) (1979).
711d. at cmt. a.
72The preamble to the Ohio Constitution reads as follows: "We, the people of the
State of Ohio, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, to secure its blessings and
promote our common welfare, do establish this Constitution." OHIO CoNsT. pmbl.
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right."73 A Bill of Rights is "that portion of [the] Constitution guaranteeing
rights and privileges to the individual."74 Taken together, Ohio's Bill of Rights
can be defined as a guarantee to the individual, from the state, to act for the
benefit of the individual, with a correlative duty resting upon the state to refrain
from acting in ways injurious to the individual. In accord with this definition,
the Constitution proclaims that the government is instituted for the equal
protection and benefit of the people.75 How is the government to know where
it can and where it cannot act so as to avoid breaching its duty to act only in
non- injurious and beneficial ways? The specific enumerations in the Bill of
Rights of the Ohio Constitution 76 provide the answer-describing in detail
those rights which are to be inherent in the people and upon which the state
may not trample.
Why should Ohio courts provide remedies for violations of the Ohio
Constitution? First, a "right without a remedy is not a legal right; it is merely a
hope or a wish"77 or, as the Ohio Supreme Court has acknowledged, a
"command without a sanction."78 Starting with the premise that, as stated
above, a right requires a correlative duty to act for the benefit of another or to
refrain from acting in a manner harmful to others, then unless that duty can be
enforced, it is not really a duty.79 Applied to constitutional rights, the "duty" is
merely a voluntary obligation that a government can fulfill or not, at its whim.80
73 Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of
Rights In Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 665, 665 n.1 (1987)(citing W. HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-38 (W. Cook ed., 1919)).
74 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 164 (6th ed. 1990).
75 OHIo CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
76
'These protections [the Bill of Rights] are imperative to the existence and
continuance of our democratic society." Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163,
171 (Ohio 1993). The people retain the right to amend the constitution and can do so in
the event the government acts in an injurious manner and/or fails to uphold its "duty"
under the constitution. See OHIO CONST. art. XVI, §§ 1-3. It is recognized that all the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights "are subject to a reasonable, nonarbitrary exercise of the
'police power' of the state or municipality when such power is exercised in the interest
of public health, safety, morals, or welfare." Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of
Dayton, 38 N.E.2d 70,73 (Ohio 1941). Considering this to be the case, a reasonable and
non-arbitrary defense would exist for those against whom an action would be filed
claiming a violation of the claimant's constitutionally protected rights. The trier of fact
would be left to determine if the government's actions were indeed reasonable and
non-arbitrary.
77 See Ziegler, supra note 73, at 678.
78 Gregory v. Flowers, 290 N.E.2d 181,186 (Ohio 1972). The Court further stated that
"a right without a remedy is a brutemfulem, i.e., no law at all." Id.
79 See Ziegler, supra note 73, at 678.
801d.
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A holder of a "correlative right can only hope that the act or forbearance will
occur"81 if he has no ability to enforce the duty or forbearance due him. Of what
significance, therefore, is a right which cannot be enforced? Absent the ability
to enforce, there is no legal right.82 Allowing a cause of action for violations of
the rights contained within the Ohio Constitution would provide the
mechanism to enforce the "duty relationship" that exists between the
government and its citizens.
Some might point to the existence of injunctive or declaratory relief as a
remedy by which the constitutional rights of Ohio's citizens can be enforced.
Indeed, the courts have the ability to grant injunctions or provide declaratory
relief to prevent the enforcement of statutes or conduct that is violative of the
Ohio Constitution.83 Of particular note in such actions, however, is the fact that
the conduct allegedly abhorrent to the Ohio Constitution has yet to occur or
can still be undone.84 The role of declaratory and injunctive relief is
substantially different when the unconstitutional act takes only one minute,
one day, or one weekend. Constitutional violations have no set time within
which to occur: an illegal search of a home can be perfected in two hours; an
unconstitutional seizure can last only a weekend; and the opportunity to vote
comes but every election. An after-the-fact decree from the local court will do
little to compensate those citizens whose rights were violated. Injunctive relief
or declaratory relief, while effective to ward off future violations, does nothing
to rectify past unconstitutional acts.
Without some method of compensating the victim and forcing the violator
to suffer some loss for his or her transgression of the Constitution, the
government's duty to forbear action that is injurious to the people is nothing
more than a hope or a wish. The Ohio Bill of Rights means little if the only
remedy available to those whose rights are violated is a warning by the court
not to do it again.
8 1 1d.
821d.
83 See e.g. Rickard v. Ohio Dep't of Liquor Control, 504 N.E.2d 724,728 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986)(Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction over declaratory judgment seeking to
determine the constitutionality of a statute).
84Injunction is defined as "[a] prohibitive equitable remedy issued ... by a court at
the suit of a party complainant, directed to the party defendant in the action, or a party
made a defendant for that purpose, forbidding the latter from doing some act which he
is threatening or attempting to commit, or restraining him in the continuance thereof.
..." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 784 (6th ed. 1990). Declaratory Judgment can be defined
as "a binding adjudication of the rights and status of litigants even though no
consequential relief is awarded." Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 579 (Wyo. 1974).
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B. The Ohio Constitution as a Source of the Remedy-Crafting Power
Ohio's courts should allow remedies for violations of constitutional rights
because of the "right-to-a-remedy" provision in the Ohio Constitution.85 Its
placement in the Bill of Rights suggests that it was the goal of the framers of
Ohio's Constitution to protect the people and their freedoms. Moreover, the
provision recognizes "that societal norms require that injured parties have the
means by which to vindicate their rights."86
Article one, section sixteen of the Ohio Constitution states that "all courts
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods,
person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have
justice administered without denial or delay."87 A logical interpretation of the
clause would suggest that it prohibits all impediments to fair judicial
process-both legislative and judicial. 88 Before reaching that conclusion,
however, a brief discussion of the clause and its history is necessary.
The "remedy" provision of the Ohio Constitution has been included since
Ohio drafted its first constitution in 1802.89 Its language, in particular the use
of the affirmative command "shall," demonstrates that the provision is a
command requiring courts to provide remedy by due course of law through
the state's legal apparatus for all who have been injured in land, goods, person,
or reputation.9 0 The text of the provision is devoid of any limitations placed
upon the command.9 1
The notion that rights should have remedies has a long tradition in both the
British and American legal systems.92 Its most famous use in the American
system is in Chief Justice John Marshall's oft-quoted opinion in Marbury v.
Madison.93 While no such provision appears in the United States Constitution,
85 See supra note 18. Ohio is one of thirty-five states whose constitutions contain "right
to remedy" provisions. Caroline Forell, The Statutory Duty Action in Tort: A
Statutory/Common Law Hybrid, 23 IND. L. REV. 781, 790 (1990).
86 Donna B. Haas Powers, Note, State Constitutions' Remedy Guarantee Provisions
Provide More Than Mere 'Lip Service' to Rendering Justice, 16 U. TOL. L. REv. 585,590 (1985).
87 0HIO CoNsT. art. I, sec. 16.
88 See Schuman, supra note 33, at 1197.
89 See OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 7.
90See Schuman, supra note 33, at 1200.
91 See OHIO CoNST. art. 1, § 16.
92 Most scholars attribute the concept to the Magna Charta, penned in 1212. See
Powers, supra note 86, at 585. The Magna Charta proclaimed "[wje will sell to no man,
we will not deny or defer to any man justice or right."Magna Cha rta, 9 Hen. 3, c.29 (1225).
Lord Coke later interpreted this provision as requiring that a remedy succeed an injury.
See 2 E. COKE, INsTITUTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 41-55 (5th ed. 1797).
935 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,163 (1803)("[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives
an injury.").
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the "right-to-a-remedy" guarantee appears in thirty-nine94 state constitutions.
Often incorporated into the state constitutions with little or no discussion,95
the provisions "arose from the basic desire for maximum personal freedom and
represented both a warning to those in power not to violate the personal
interests of the people, as well as the political philosophy of the revolution, for
unrestricted liberty."96
There are numerous theories of what the "right-to-a-remedy" provision
actually means and how it should be interpreted. 97 Attempting to apply any
one definition or interpretation to all thirty-nine state remedy provisions,
however, does an injustice to the individualistic nature and historical
background of each state.98 The appropriate question is not "what does the
remedy provision mean," but rather "what does the remedy provision mean in
state X?"99 In order to determine whether the remedy provision in Ohio's
Constitution can be used as a vehicle for permitting a cause of action for
damages based upon a violation of the Ohio Constitution, one must answer
"what does the remedy provision mean in Ohio?"
Ohio courts have had numerous occasions to examine the Constitution's
"right-to-remedy" clause and have given its mandate a broad interpretation. A
review of these decisions reveals that the "right-to-a-remedy" clause would not
just encourage, but require recognition of a cause of action for damages
resulting from a constitutional violation. A few examples serve to illustrate this
proposition.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in Kintz v. Harringer,lOO abolished the
common-law immunity for statements made before a grand jury. In so doing
the court proclaimed that it is the "primary duty of courts to sustain the
94 See Schuman, supra note 33, at 1200.
95 See Powers, supra note 86, at 586.
961d. (citing Comment, Article I, Section 19 of the Maine Constitution: The Forgotten
Mandate, 21 ME. L. REV. 83,84 (1969)).
97 See Schuman, supra note 33, at 1203-04. Schuman places the interpretations into
three categories: 1) "no restriction" interpretations which hold that the remedy
provisions apply only to judicial procedures as opposed to substantive legislation; 2)
"due process" interpretations which hold that only fundamental remedies are immune
from "legislative extinction"; and 3) "constitutional incorporation" interpretations which
hold that the provision bars elimination of remedies that were established and in
existence at the time the provision was placed into the constitution. Id.
981d. at 1220. Schuman notes that a remedy guarantee means one thing if placed in
the constitution of a people particularly distrustful of their legislature and it means quite
another thing if placed in the constitution by a community with an "anti-judicial bias."
Id.
99 See Schuman, supra note 33, at 1203.
100124 N.E. 168 (Ohio 1919). The holding of the case was overruled in
Taplin-Ric-Clerkin Co. v. Hower, 177 N.E. 203 (Ohio 1931). The Court's use and
interpretation of the Ohio Constitution's remedy provision, however, is still quoted. See
infra note 110 and accompanying text.
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declaration of right and remedy [as contained in the Ohio Constitution],
whenever the same has been wrongfully invaded." 101 The court noted that one
of the most sacred rights is the right to a good name and reputation, and that
citizens ought to be protected in the "enjoyment of that good name and
reputation."102 Of particular interest is the candor with which the court deals
with the precedent barring causes of action based upon similar claims. In
upholding the right to a remedy, overturning the common-law immunity and
all the precedents upholding it, the court noted that "precedents are valuable
for information, admonition, and as milestones in the nation's progress. But
they do not necessarily imply the last word of wisdom. They are not always to
be adopted. They are frequently to be avoided."103 The court thus used the
"right to a remedy" to allow a cause of action, thereby overturning years of case
law to the contrary.
Nearly thirty years later, the court of appeals in Armstrong v. DullY, 104 held
that a union's by-laws, in the absence of self- binding limitations by contract,
could not prevent the union's members from resorting to the courts for
remedy.105 In so holding, the court reasoned that "it is the right of every citizen
of this state to seek remedy by court action for any injuries done to him in his
person or property"106 and he is entitled "to have justice administered
according to law, without denial or delay, and any person who attempts to
interfere unlawfully with this right is guilty of a violation of the fundamental
principles guaranteed by constitutional and statutory principles."107 The
"fundamental principle" guaranteed by the Constitution was the remedy clause
of article one, section sixteen of Ohio's Constitution. 108
In more recent times the courts have stated that courts have a duty to protect
the rights of parties involved in litigation, thus guaranteeing access to the
judicial system.109 The notion that the Ohio Constitution provides some
guarantee of access to the courts was articulated by the supreme court in Hardy
v. VerMeulen.110 At issue was a statute barring medical malpractice claims
brought more than four years after the act or omission constituting the alleged
101d.
1 021d. at 169.
103 d.
104103 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951).
105d. at 769.
106Id.
107 d.
108Armstrong, 103 N.E.2d at 768.
109Finley v. Kline, 557 N.E.2d 853, 854 (Ohio P. Ct. 1988), affd, CA-923, unreported
(January 26, 1990).
110512 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1987). This decision cites and relies upon the Kintz Court's
analysis of the remedy provision. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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malpractice occurred, and whether the statute could be applied to people who
either did not know or could not reasonably have known of their injuries within
the proscribed four year period. 111 The court found the measure, as applied,
unconstitutional as violative of the remedy provision of article one, section
sixteen of the Ohio Constitution. 112 The decision finds its logical basis in the
denial of a remedy, i.e. that a person who discovers she is the victim of medical
malpractice is locked out of the courtroom because she failed to discover
[perhaps could not discover] the injury within a proscribed period of time.113
To this proposition the court interpreted the remedy provision of the
Constitution with a broad brush, proclaiming "the language in the Constitution
is clear and leaves little room for maneuvering. Our courts are open to those
seeking remedy for injury to person, property or reputation."114
Lastly, the Ohio Supreme Court provided its most recent interpretation of
the remedy provision in Brennamen v. R.M.I. Company; Bechtel Group, Inc.,115
thereby demonstrating a commitment to allowing access to the courts for those
who have been wronged. At the center of the controversy in Brennamen was
Ohio's statute of repose. 116 The statute of repose "barred tort actions against
designers and engineers of improvements to real property which are brought
more than ten years after completion of the construction services." 117 The effect
of the statute was to deprive claimants of a "right to sue" before they either
knew or could have known of their decedents' injuries. 118 In Brennamen, this
meant that the families of two men killed in an industrial accident caused by a
defectively manufactured and installed valve/piping system could not
maintain a cause of action 119 against those who had designed and installed the
piping system because the work done at the property was done more than ten
years before the accident. 120
lllHardy, 512 N.E.2d at 627.
l121d. at 628.
l13Id, at 630.
1141. at 628.
115639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994).
116 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131(1971)
ll 7 Brennamen, 639 N.E.2d at 428.
118 d. at 430.
l19d. at 427. A cause of action had been filed against the defendant Bechtel Group,
Inc., alleging negligence, breach of warranty, and products liability in the design and
construction of the handling system that eventually failed. Id. The trial court granted
summary judgment in Bechtel's favor and the court of appeals affirmed, finding that
the statute of repose barred any action against Bechtel as a matter of law. Id.
120Brennamen, 639 N.E.2d at 427. Bechtel had performed the work in 1958. Id.
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The Ohio Supreme Court struck down the statute of repose as a violation of
the remedy provision. 121 Noting that article one, section sixteen "protects the
right to seek redress in Ohio's courts when one is injured by another,"122 and
that "at a minimum, article one, section sixteen requires that the plaintiffs have
a reasonable time to enter the courthouse to seek compensation after the
accident,"123 the Court overturned a four-year-old decision124 upholding the
constitutionality of the statute and, in doing so, "reopen[ed] the courthouse
doors."125
The preceding analysis reveals two principles of Ohio law. First, Ohio's Bill
of Rights represents an attempt by its framers to protect the people of Ohio and
their freedoms. 126 It imposes upon the state certain obligations or duties to act
for the benefit of, or to refrain from acting in a way that injures, the people. 12 7
Second, Ohio has a long-embraced notion that its courts should be open to
those in need of redress128 and those injured by others should have remedy for
their injuries.12 9 In the words of Justice Pfeifer in Brennamen, the "courthouse
doors shall be open."130
In light of the protective nature of the Bill of Rights and the strong emphasis
placed upon access to the courts, Ohio's courts have the ability and the
authority to permit a cause of action to arise directly from a violation of a
provision of the Ohio Constitution. The protections of the Bill of Rights demand
enforcement and the Constitution demands remedy for injury. Combined, the
two principles require that the courts be open to a claim for damages arising
directly from the violation of a constitutionally protected right.
1211d. at 430.
122 1d. at 427.
123 Id.
124 Sedar v. Knowlton Construction Co., 551 N.E.2d 938 (Ohio 1990). The decision
analyzed the "right-to-a-remedy" provision in the Ohio Constitution and had sought to
construe it in a constrained manner. Specifically, the Court argued that "the
right-to-a-remedy provision of articlel, section 16 applies only to existing vested rights,
and it is state law which determines what injuries are recognized and what remedies
are available." Id. at 947. Brennamen unequivocally rejected this holding; Sedar was
overturned.
125 Brennamen, 639 N.E.2d at 430.
126 Powers, supra note 86, at 589. See also OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2.
127 Ziegler, supra note 73.
128 See Jeffries, 11 Ohio at 372.
129 See Hardy v. VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987), cert. denied, 848 U.S. 1066 (1988).
130639 N.E.2d 425,430, amended, 643 N.E.2d 138 (1994).
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C. The Doctrine of Self-execution as a Remedy-Crafting Vehicle
A commonly advanced argument against judicial recognition of a cause of
action based solely upon a constitutional violation is that the creation of
remedies belongs with the state legislature. Those supporting this argument
would point to the existence of a statutory remedy (regardless of its adequacy)
and declare that "the legislature has spoken." For the courts to provide a second,
more adequately tailored remedy to co-exist with any provided by statute
would impermissibly interfere with the legislative process. 131 Likewise, where
no remedy has been provided by the legislature, as is the case in Ohio, the
legislative inaction is accorded the same authority as legislative action.132
Under this method of analysis, when the legislature acts, its action is supreme;
when the legislature does not act, its inaction is supreme. Under either scenario,
the judiciary is effectively removed from the process.
Some have argued the converse-that the legislature should be (or always
was) removed from the process of affording remedies for constitutional
violations. One commentator has noted, "the Constitution should be
enforceable on its own terms, not because of its congruence with state law.
... "133 Supporters of this theory argue that instead of relying on statutes to
interpret or give effect to constitutional provisions, the provisions should be
recognized as "self-executing;" both binding upon government actors and with
violations automatically capable of remedy through the courts.134 This
approach embraces the longstanding principle that "where a constitution
asserts a certain right, or lays down a certain principle of law or procedure, it
speaks for the entire people .... and is full authority for all that is done in
pursuance of its provisions."135 To assert otherwise is to concede that rights "lie
dormant"136 within constitutions, waiting for legislation to awaken them. For
those who would relegate to the legislature the task of remedying
constitutional violations, the self-executing nature of constitutional rights may
prove difficult to overcome.
131See e.g., Kelly Property Development, Inc. v. Lebanon, 627 A.2d 909, 924 (Conn.
1993)(refusing to recognize a "Bivens-type" causeof action in Connecticut where existing
statutory remedies are present); Provens, 594 N.E.2d 959 (deferring to remedies created
by state legislature, despite the fact that such remedies may be inadequate).
132The argument is commonly made that had the legislature wanted a remedy, it
would have created one; since the legislature has not acted, it does not want a remedy.
133Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-executing Constitution, 68 S. CA. L. REV.
289, 291 (1995).
134The judiciary is charged with interpreting the Constitution and protecting it from
encroachment by the other branches.
135Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403-04 (1900).
136Tammy Wyatt-Shaw, The Doctrine of Self-execution and the Environmental Provisions
of the Montana State Constitution: "They Mean Something", 15 PuB. LAND L. REV. 219, 221
(1994)(citing THOMAS J. COOLEY, 1 COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIoNS 165, 169
(Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927)).
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1. Self-Executing Defined
A constitutional provision is "self-executing" if "the judiciary can enforce the
provision without the aid of a legislative enactment."137 Succinctly stated, a
constitutional right exists regardless of whether the legislature chooses to
recognize it. By removing legislative action as a pre-requisite to enforcement
of constitutional provisions, the doctrine of self-execution recognizes that the
Constitution is supreme, the judicial branch is charged with upholding the
Constitution, and that enforcing constitutional provisions "is not dependent on
the assent of the political branches"138 but that, to the contrary, the Constitution
"is meant to circumscribe the power of government where it threatens to
encroach on individuals."139 Consistent with the separation of the branches of
government, Constitutional protections "must be enforceable by individuals
even when the political branches do not choose it to be."140
2. Other States' Approaches
Several courts have shown a willingness to use self-executing state
constitutional provisions as vehicles for the recognition of a cause of action
arising directly from a violation of their respective state constitutions,
regardless of legislative authorization or input. California, in particular, has
used the self-execution doctrine as the basis for a "constitutional cause of
action."
The premise that self-executing provisions in the California Constitution
could give rise to a cause of action has been discussed in numerous California
state court opinions. 141 In Porten v. University of San Francisco,142 the California
Court of Appeals held the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for damages
arising out of the defendant's violation of plaintiff's constitutionally protected
right to privacy.143 After holding that the constitutional right to privacy
13 7 Wyatt-Shaw, supra note 136, at 2. See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 1360 (6th ed.
1990)(defining "self-executing constitutional provisions" as "provisions which are
immediately effective without the aid of ancillary legislation").
138 d. at 292. Although Bandes' discussion concerns itself with the United States
Constitution, the premiseof herargumentis equally applicable to theOhio Constitution.
1391d.
14 0Id.
141 See Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist., 185 Cal. Rptr. 758 (Cal. App.
1982); Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation of Laguna Hills, 182 Cal. Rptr.
813 (Cal. App. 1982); Porten v. University of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Cal. App.
1976); White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975). Cf. Bonner v. City of Santa Ana, 33 Cal.
Rptr.2d 233 (Cal. App. 1994).
142 Porten, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
14 3Porten alleged that the university had improperly released confidential
information concerning his grades and premised his cause of action upon a claimed
violation of California's constitutionally protected "right to privacy." Id.
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protected the unauthorized release of confidential student information,144 the
court held that Porten could collect damages based upon the defendant's
violation of that right.145 Apparently addressing the absence of legislative
authorization of any such claim, the court explained that "the constitutional
provision is self- executing; hence, it confers a judicial right of action on all
Californians." 146
Several years later the use of self-execution as a vehicle for a constitutional
cause of action resurfaced. In Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Foundation,147
the plaintiffs alleged violations of their state constitutional rights to free speech
and free press and sought damages on the basis of the "self-executing modality"
of article 1, section 2 of the California Constitution.148 After holding that no
cause of action existed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,149 the Laguna court permitted
plaintiff's cause of action, noting "it is too plain for argument that our state
constitution has been interpreted to support an action for damages for a
violation of rights arising under old section 1, article 1,150 and that such reliance
was possible without the need for enabling legislation."151 The violation of
plaintiffs' rights to free speech and press alone provided a "direct right to sue
for damages."152 The case was remanded for trial.
Self-execution was also addressed in Fenton v. Groveland Community Services
District153-- a modern-day case similar to Ohio's Jeffries154 decision. Faced with
whether to allow a cause of action premised solely upon the plaintiffs' having
144 d. Article I, § 1 of the California Constitution reads: "[AIll people are by nature free
and independent, and have certain inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."
145Porten, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
146 d. at 842 (citation omitted).
147182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. App. 1982).
148 d. at 815. Article 1 § 2(a) of the California Constitution states as follows: "Every
person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech
or press."
1 4 9 1d. at 832. The court upheld the trial court's determination that there was
insufficient state action necessary to invoke federal constitutional provisions and,
therefore, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
1 50Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution was at issue in Porten. See supra
notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
15lLaguna Publising Co., 182 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
1521d. The court specifically stated that plaintiffs' ability to sue for damages "accrued
under Article I, Section 2" of the California Constitution-the rights to free speech and
free press. Id.
153185 Cal. Rptr. 758 (Cal. App. 1982).
154 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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been denied their constitutionally protected right to vote, the Fenton court
noted that "the state constitution may provide a cause of action independent
from any statute providing for liability."155 Addressing self-execution as a
method of providing for such causes of action, the court opined that "[the right
to vote would appear to be contained in a self-executing provision of the
Constitution as is [sic] the right to free speech and free press."156 Indicating that
California constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing, 157 the
court declared that "this presumption will be given effect unless it appears that
legislation is required to implement the right granted."158 Because those rights
are contained in self-executing provisions, a "governmental entity may not
violate [them] without standing accountable for any provable damages."159
Accordingly, the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim was reversed.
As in California, other courts160 have acknowledged that violations of
self-executing constitutional provisions can give rise to a claim for damages
absent legislative authorization. Vermont addressed the issue in Shields v.
Gerhart.161 Carol Shields filed suit against the director of the Vermont Division
of Licensing and Registrations for Social and Rehabilitation Services and three
department employees alleging that her license to operate a day-care center
had been revoked in retaliation for her public opposition to the Department's
policy against the use of corporal punishment.162 Her complaint alleged
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as violations of the Vermont
Constitution. 163
Addressing whether money damages were available to a citizen whose
constitutional rights had been violated, the Vermont Supreme Court
acknowledged a two-step inquiry: (1) "we must first determine whether the
constitutional provisions involved are self-executing, that is, whether they
support an action against the state or its agents without implementing
155Fenton, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 762 (citing legislative recognition of this fact).
156/d.
157 d.
158 d. at 763.
15 9Fenton, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
160See, e.g., Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, 408 So.2d 711 (Fla. App. Ct. 1982), affd,
432 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1983).
161658 A.2d 924 (Vt. 1995).
162 d. at 926.
163 d. Shields had argued that Chapter 1, Articles 1 and 13 of the Vermont Constitution
provided her a private cause of action against those who violated her constitutional
rights. Id. at 926. The trial court rebuffed the claim on three grounds: (1) there is no
private right of action for money damages for violation of the Vermont Constitution; (2)
even if there were such a claim available in appropriate cases, there were alternative
avenues available that should have been pursued; and (3) sovereign immunity barred
the claims. Id. at 927.
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legislation;" and (2) "if we find a provision is self-executing, we must determine
whether monetary damages are available as a remedy for a violation."164
Conducting the analysis, the court, citing Davis v. Burke,165 noticed that
"[w]here a constitution asserts a certain right, or lays down a certain principle
of law or procedure, it speaks for the entire people as their supreme law, and
is full authority for all that is done in pursuance of its provisions."166 In
deference to this principle, "the absence of enabling statutes cannot be
construed to nullify rights provided by the constitution if those rights are
sufficiently specified."167 After stating the common law principle that there
shall be remedy for every wrong,168 the court concluded by iterating that "[t]o
deprive individuals of a means by which to vindicate their constitutional rights
would negate the will of the people in ratifying the constitution, and neither
this Court nor the Legislature has the power to do so."169
Having declared that violations of self-executing constitutional provisions
would support an action against those who perpetrated the violation,170 the
court next conducted an analysis of self-execution. Specifically, the court
sought to establish tests for determining when and under what circumstances
a constitutional provision will be self-executing. Accordingly, "a self-executing
provision should do more than express only general principles; it may describe
the right in detail, including the means for its enjoyment and protection."171 In
addition, "a self-executing provision does not contain a directive to the
legislature for further action," although "the legislative history may be
particularly informative as to the provision's intended operation."172 Lastly, "a
decision for or against self-execution must harmonize with the scheme of rights
established in the constitution as a whole."173
Examining Vermont's right to free speech 174 under its articulated test, the
court concluded that the provision was indeed self-executing. 175 First, taking
164 Shields, 658 A.2d at 927 (citations omitted).
165179 U.S. 399 (1900).
166 Shields, 658 A.2d at 927 (citing Davis, 179 U.S. at 399).
167 d. (citations omitted).
168See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
169Shie/ds, 658 A.2d at 928.
170Id. at 930.
17 1 d. at 928 (citing Convention Center Referendum Comm. v. Board of Elections and
Ethics, 399 A.2d 550, 552 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979)).
172Id.
173Shields, 658 A.2d at 928.
174 VT. CoNsT. ch. I, art. 13. The provision reads: "[Tihat the people have a right to
freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments, concerning the
transactions of government, and therefore the freedom of the press ought not be
restrained." Id.
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cognizance of the provision's language, the court found its commands to be
more than "general principles alone;" noting that it contains a single, specific
right of the people to make themselves heard-a "fundamental characteristic
of democratic government. 176 In addition, the free speech provision did not
contain a legislative directive. 177 Applying the third criterion necessary to
establish self-execution, the court found that self-execution of free speech rights
would comport with the general constitutional scheme because free speech is
"crucial to the operation of government and vital to the effectuation of other
enumerated rights."178 Allowing an individual the opportunity to seek redress
when his right to free speech does not do violence to the overall constitutional
scheme.
In spite of the emphasis the court placed on both the self-executing nature
of Vermont's right to free speech as well as its significance in the constitutional
scheme, the Shields court was unwilling to hold that its violation could always
give rise to a cause of action for monetary damages. Deferring to legislative
action, the court instead held that a monetary remedy for violations of
self-executing constitutional provisions was not appropriate when other,
legislatively crafted remedies existed.179 The "remedy" available to Shields
consisted primarily of an administrative appeal of her licensure revocation and
denial.180 Because Shields failed to pursue this remedy, her claim for monetary
damages was barred.181
3. Self-execution in Ohio.
The doctrine of self-execution can and should be used by Ohio's courts in
order to recognize a cause of action arising directly from a violation of Ohio's
constitutional mandates. As acknowledged in Shields182 and Davis,183 the
protections afforded under a state or federal constitution are vital to a
democratic society. To deny an injured party the means of seeking a full and
adequate redress for constitutional transgressions-based upon the claim that
the legislature has not "permitted" a means of vindication-ignores the essence
of rights as things to be enforced and concedes that rights are, in fact, dormant
175Shields, 658 A.2d at 930.
176/d.
1771d.
1781d.
179Shields, 658 A.2d at 934. "Where the legislature has provided a remedy, although
it may not be as effective for the plaintiff as money damages, we will ordinarily defer
to the statutory remedy and refuse to supplement it."
1801d. at 936.
1 811d.
182See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
183See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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until recognized by the legislature. Recognizing Ohio's constitutional
protections as self-executing would neutralize the "legislation authorization'
argument, recognize that constitutional rights are not "dormant," and enable
courts to provide effective and adequate relief where state actors run afoul of
the Constitution's provisions.
In Ohio, all constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing.184
This presumption is stimulated by the knowledge that, "if not treated as
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the directions of fundamental law."185 It follows, therefore, that
anything done in violation of a self-executing provision is void.186
Nevertheless, where the presumption is challenged, a self- execution test has
been developed. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated:
One of the recognized rules is that a constitutional provision is not self-
executing when it merely lays down general principles, but that it is
self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right
which it grants may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty which it
imposes may be enforced, without the aid of legislative enactment.
Therefore, if a constitutional provision either directly or by implication
imposes a duty upon an officer, no legislation is necessary to require
the performance of such duty. Another way of stating this general,
governing principle is that a constitutional provision is self-executing
if there is nothing to be done by the legislature to put it in operation..
.. [I]t must be regarded as self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no languge indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action.
In addition, courts are to consider the language of the provision, the objects to
be accomplished, and the surrounding circumstances. 188
To apply tests of self-execution to fundamental protections in Ohio's
Constitution, only to conclude that such provisions are self-executing, would
184State ex rel. Russell v. Bliss, 101 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio 1951)(addressing constitutional
provisions mandating the rotation of candidates' names on a ballot).
185Id. at 291.
186Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 96 N.E.2d 314,317 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951); Link v. Public
Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 131 N.E. 7%, 797 (Ohio 1921)("No legislative act can in any way
modify or redistrict the power conferred by constitutional provision, and therefore any
provision of the statute inconsistent with the constitutional provision conferring such
power must fall.").
18 7Russell, 101 N.E.2d at 291 (citing 11 Am. JUR. § 74 (1938)). See also 16 AM JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 143 (1979).
18 8State v. Stouffer, 276 N.E.2d 651,653 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) ("In determining whether
a constitutional amendment is self-executing, the general rule is that courts will consider
the language used, theobjects to be accomplished and the surrounding circumstances.").
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seem an exercise in the obvious. Indeed, the authorities cited above all
concluded that their respective state constitution's protections of fundamental
rights were self- executing. Few would argue that a different result should be
reached in Ohio. For example, Ohio's free speech and press provision
specifically declares that "[e]very citizen may freely speak, write, and publish
his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and
no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the
press."189 Not only can one find a clear duty to refrain from abridging, but the
provision's language unequivocally excludes the legislature from restraining
or abridging free speech and press. Ohio's other constitutional protections are
equally as clear.190
The more difficult question, as was the case in the above authorities, is
whether Ohio's courts should use self-execution as a vehicle for awarding
damages. No Ohio court has ever addressed the issue directly; Jeffriesl 9' came
the closest-acknowledging the principle 192 but never explaining the rationale.
The absence of specific Ohio authority should not, of course, serve to
dissuade courts from using the self-execution doctrine. As a method of
removing the legislature from effectively deciding which constitutional rights
are enforceable and what remedies are available for the injured, the doctrine
serves only to reinforce the principles that constitutional rights are
unassailable 193 and automatically subject to enforcement. 194 Further, as a
method of justifying an award of damages, the self-execution doctrine
enhances and reinforces the separation of powers-declaring that enforcement
of constitutional rights belongs with the judicial branch and, when rights are
violated, the judicial branch is within its jurisdiction to craft remedies to redress
the wrongs.
The Ohio Constitution is enforceable not because the Ohio legislature
authorizes enforceability, but because its provisions contain rights and rights,
by definition,195 are enforceable.
18 90Hio CONST. art. 1, § 11.
19 0See supra note 12.
19 1 See supra notes 1 - 10 and accompanying text.
192 The Jeffries Court ignored legislative inaction and crafted its own remedy. See supra
note 10 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text discussing the definition of a "right."
194 See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text discussing the necessity of providing
remedies when rights are violated.
195 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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D. The Role of Public Policy
The Constitution of the State of Ohio provides for a system of courts to
administer justice.196 Implicit in the duties charged to the courts is the duty to
preserve the existence of the rights and protections afforded by the Ohio
Constitution. To execute those duties, it is necessary that the "constitution be
supported in its full vigor."197 How does the court preserve the existence of
rights and "support the Constitution in its full vigor" when it is faced with an
issue on which the legislature has not spoken? One way to do so is to render
decisions which further the policies articulated within the Constitution and a
powerful way of doing so is by reference to public policy.
The Constitution of the State of Ohio contains within its pages the public
policy of those who live under its rule.198 As such, these "public policies must
be paramount, though a score of statutes conflict and multitude of judicial
196 See OHIO CONST. art. IV, §§ 2-4. Of the three levels of courts expressly established
by the Ohio Constitution, common pleas courts are, by far, provided with the most
wide-ranging grant of original jurisdiction; the Constitution states that "the courts of
common pleas and divisions thereof shall have original jurisdiction over all justiciable
matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and
agencies as may be provided by law." OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4(B). As a court of "general
jurisdiction," therefore, the common pleas court possesses the authority to determine its
own jurisdiction over the subject matter in any action pending before it, with such
determination subject to review by the court of appeals. State ex rel. Heimann v. George,
344 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio 1976). Absent a statute, common-law decision, or constitutional
provision declaring the courts' inability to heara matter, a common pleas court can hear
any claim involving a "justiciable matter."
That matters involving the violation of constitutional rights are justiciable can
hardly be doubted. Acts of the legislature are routinely scrutinized by the courts,
searching to determine if any of the rights contained within the Constitution have been
violated. Seesupranote 115 and accompanying text. The farmore difficult situationarises
however, where constitutionality is questioned and there has been no legislative action.
The jurisdictional nature of the common pleas courts is to be contrasted with their
counterpart district courts in the federal system. The federal district courts do not have
general jurisdiction, but rather are given specific requirements that must be met in order
for a claim to be heard. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The significance of this difference manifests
itself when overemphasis is placed on Bivens and its progeny. While the U.S. Supreme
Court's recognition of the "no right without a remedy" principle lends credibility to the
concept, the nature of the statutorily imposed subject matter jurisdiction requirements
makes tenuous the meaning of the principle. Remedies in the federal courts only exist
if a statute grants jurisdiction to hear the claim. If jurisdiction is revoked or expressly
denied, there will be no remedy-regardless of the right held.
1971 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, Of the Absolute Right of Individuals *144.
198Kintz, 124 N.E.2d at 170. See also Mills-Jennigs of Ohio, Inc. v. Department of Liquor,
435 N.E.2d 407, 410 (Ohio 1982)(noticing that Constitution evidences a strong public
policy against gambling); Zepp v. City of Columbus, 12 N.E.2d 46, 49 (Ohio
1951)(Constitution of Ohio contains public policy with respect to lotteries); Inglis v.
Pontius, 131 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ohio 1921)(upheld state statute and declared that, as a
basis for doing so, "the Constitution of Ohio has made declarations as to the policy of
the people on this subject").
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decisions be to the contrary."199 When combined with the notions that the state
has a duty to operate according to the requirements of the Bill of Rights and
that the judiciary has a duty to "support the Constitution to its full vigor,"200 it
follows that the courts should render decisions which hold the "policies" of the
Constitution superior to all acts, including the acts of a government which is
duty-bound to function within the confines of the Constitution. The court
recently had the opportunity to render a decision which upheld and reinforced
the "policies" of the Constitution.
In Painter v. Graley,2 0 1 the plaintiff, a chief deputy clerk in the Cleveland
Municipal Court, asked for time off in order to run for Cleveland City
Council.202 Shortly thereafter, and in response to her request, she was
discharged from her position.203 The Deputy Clerk responded by filing suit,
claiming that the sole reason she had been discharged from her position was
her decision to become a candidate for Cleveland City Council 204 and that a
discharge premised upon such reasoning violated article one, sections two and
eleven of the Ohio Constitution.2 05 Accordingly, she argued that a public
employer could not, based upon the rights guaranteed under the Ohio
Constitution, dismiss a public employee because the employee became a
candidate for public office. 20 6
The court, per Justice Sweeney, agreed that an at-will employee may state a
cause of action for wrongful discharge where she is discharged in
contravention of clear public policy statements 2° 7 contained in the Ohio
199 Ziegler, supra note 73 and accompanying text.
200BLAcKSToNE, supra note 197.
201639 N.E.2d 51 (Ohio 1994).
202 d. at 51.
203 Id.
2 04 Id. at 53. The Defendant never gave any other reason for the termination and never
disputed the assertion that the decision to run for public office was the sole reason for
plaintiff's termination. Id. at 53, n.3.
205Article I, section 2 of the Ohio Constitution states that "[alll political power is
inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit,
and they have the right to alter, reform, or abolish the same, whenever they deem it
necessary; and no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may not
be altered, revoked, or repealed by the general assembly." Article I, section 11 of the
Ohio Constitution, the "free speech" provision, states, in pertinent part, "Every citizen
may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty
of speech, or of the press."
206 Painter, 639 N.E.2d at 53.
207The Court disagreed with Ms. Painter's assertion that the Ohio Constitution,
through article 1, sections 2 and 11, guaranteed her a right to run for office or prevented
her public employer from prohibiting her from running for office. Id. at 53. No such
right is contained in the Constitution. Id.
[Vol. 43:459
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss3/4
OPENING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS
Constitution.208 In so deciding, the court noted that "provisions found in the
Ohio Constitution are necessarily statements of Ohio public policy, if not the
most definitive statements of Ohio public policy."20 9 While the court found that
no provision of the Ohio Constitution guaranteed or assured the right to run
for public office, the court remained silent as to what other policies contained
in the Constitution might, if violated, give rise to a cause of action for wrongful
discharge, noting only that the newly articulated exception to the at-will
doctrine would apply only in situations where the violation of the public policy
is "of equally serious import as the violation of a statute."2 10
The Painter decision is significant in two respects. First, the court, by
declaring that the Ohio Constitution is the embodiment of public policy, is
reaffirming the notion that the Constitution contains those ideas which we, as
a society, believe are important.211 If the concepts behind the "freedoms"
contained in the Bill of Rights are significant enough to merit placement in the
Constitution so as to avoid infringement by the government,212 should not
society recognize the significance of these freedoms beyond the interaction
with government? Indeed, Painter stands for just that proposition. If a public
employer discharges an at-will employee for doing something which the
Constitution protects and deems fundamentally important, that employee has
been wronged and, as Painter articulated, he should be entitled to maintain a
cause of action against the employer.
2 13
The Painter decision also recognized that employees can file suit against
employers who discharge them in contravention of the public policies
articulated in Ohio's Constitution. 214 The Painter court was willing to recognize
that employers who discharge employees in an attempt to prevent the
employees from exercising rights contained within the Ohio Constitution may
be held liable for damages. 215 The use of such broad language in support of the
Constitution bedevils the logic behind denying a cause of action against a
208Painter, 639 N.E.2d at 56. The Court also held that such public policy statements
can be contained in administrative rules and regulations as well as the common law. Id.
2091d.
2 10 Id.
211Public policy is "community common sense and common conscience, extended
and applied throughout the state to matters of public morals, safety, welfare, and the
like; it is that general and well settled public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable
duty to his fellow men, having due regard to all circumstances of each particular relation
and situation." Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793,796 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
2 12 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
2 13 painter, 639 N.E.2d at 56.
2 14 The cause of action for a wrongful employee discharge in violation of public policy,
like the cause of action being proposed herein, is of judicial origin. See Greeley v. Miami
Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 1989).
215Painter, 639 N.E.2d at 56.
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government actor when his actions violate not just the policy underlying the
Constitution, but the provisions of the document itself?
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S FAILURE TO ALLOW A CAUSE OF ACTION ARISING
DIRECTLY FROM A VIOLATION OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION
Only once has the Ohio Supreme Court directly addressed the possibility of
sustaining a cause of action for constitutional violations, arising not from any
legislative enactment, but directly from the Constitution.2 16 The decision, while
denying the cause of action on the facts involved, demonstrates a willingness
to recognize a cause of action arising directly from constitutional violations.
217
In 1992 the Supreme Court decided Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities.218 The plaintiff, Patricia Provens, was
a teacher employed in the Defendant's school facility.2 19 The crux of Ms.
Provens complaint was that she was "harassed, discriminated against, and
disciplined"22 0 as a result of her having "criticized the operation and practices
of the board [the defendant], and having filed discrimination charges against
the board with both the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and the Equal
Opportunity Commission."22 1 Ms. Provens further alleged that, in violation of
her "constitutional rights," her employer unlawfully searched her desk and
singled her out for discriminatory treatment.222 Moreover, Ms. Provens alleged
that the Board retaliated against her because she "had initiated an assault and
battery lawsuit against administrative employees of the board."
223
2 16Provens v. Stark County Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities, 594 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1992).
21 7 When reading the analysis that follows, it is necessary to remember that Painter v.
Graley was decided two years after Provens. Many of the statements made in Provens
were modified or repudiated in Painter, although Painter did not overturn Provens. The
two cases should be read together.
218594 N.E.2d 959.
2 19 d. at 959.
2 20Id. at 960.
2 211d. Among the incidents of 'harassment" alleged by Ms. Provens are: "1. She has
been accused by her supervisors of not performing her job. 2. She was watched by her
supervisors, and was told by supervisors that they were watching her and would 'get'
her if she was out of her classroom. 3. She was spoken to byher supervisors about being
absent from her assigned classroom, was asked 'why were you out, what were you
doing?' and was advised, 'you shouldn't be out of your classroom.'" Id. For a list of the
other fourteen alleged incidents of harassment, see id. n.2.
2221d. at 960.
223 Id.
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While Ms. Provens' complaint did not specifically set forth the constitutional
provisions which were alleged to have been violated, the appellate briefs relied
primarily upon a violation of Ohio's right to free speech. 224 The complaint
sought injunctive relief225 as well as compensatory and punitive damages.226
The trial court granted the Board's summary judgment motion, stating that
"'a private cause of action under the Ohio Constitution does not exist', and held
that it would be inappropriate for the court to create a new judicial remedy."227
The court of appeals agreed and upheld summary judgment for the same
reason.22 8
On a motion to certify the record, 22 9 the Supreme Court, per Justice Holmes,
upheld the award of summary judgment granted in favor of the Board. 23 0 In
doing so the court found that the "right to free speech" provision of article one,
section eleven of the Ohio Constitution does not "provide an individual cause
of action for an alleged violation of such constitutional right."231 Adhering to
the court's common-law ability to create a remedy when a right has been
invaded or violated,232 the Court noted that "this Court is empowered to grant
relief not expressly provided by the legislature, and may grant relief by creating
a new remedy."233 However, the court held that it would "refrain from doing
so where other statutory provisions and administrative procedures provide
meaningful remedies."23 4
22 4OHIo CONST. art. I, §11. Ms. Provens' appellate brief also relied upon OHIO CONST.
art. I, §§ 1, 2, 3, 14, and 16. Id. at 960, n.1. These sections of the Bill of Rights are,
respectively, the rights to freedom, life, liberty, happiness and safety, and the protection
of property; the equal protection and benefit clause; the freedom of assembly and
grievance clause; the search and seizure clause; and the due process and open courts
clause (right-to-a-remedy provision). Id.
22 5See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
22 6Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 960.
22 7 d. at 961.
22 81d. The court of appeals relied upon Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983). Such reliance
must be scrutinized given the jurisdictional differences between the federal and state
courts. See supra note 196.
229 d. at 959.
230Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 966.
23 1 d. at 961. The Court also noted that "this court has never pronounced it be the
common law of this state that a public employee has a private cause of action against
her employer to redress alleged violations by her employer of policies embodied in
Ohio's Constitution." Id. Two years later, in Painter, the Court would so hold. See supra
notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF
TORTS § 874(A)(1979); Friesen, supra note 14, at 1281.
233 Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 961-62.
234Id. at 962. While Ms. Provens argued that the remedy she sought would be in
addition to any administrative remedies available to her, the Court simply looked to the
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In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Bush v. Lucas235 for the proposition that, in choosing
whether to create a new remedy, the courts should pay heed to "any special
factors counseling hesitation. 236 Specifically, the court cited Bush for the
proposition that courts should not create new remedies for actions alleging
violations of constitutional rights when the claim arises from an employment
relationship "governed by comprehensive procedural and substantive
provisions giving meaningful remedies. ... '237 In Bush this meant that the
Court would not create a new remedy for his alleged free speech violations
because the plaintiff had available "numerous procedural provisions,'238 all of
which govern the federal employment relationship.
Relying upon the Bush rationale, the Provens court denied Ms. Provens' claim
and refused to allow a remedy based upon a constitutional violation. In
particular, the Court noted that Ms. Provens had remedies available to her
through the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the State Employment Relations
Board, and the State Personnel Board of Review.239 Accordingly, the Court held
that "public employees do not have a private cause of action against their
employer to redress alleged violations by their employer of policies embodied
in the Ohio Constitution when it is determined that there are other satisfactory
remedies provided by statutory enactment and administrative process."240
While seemingly dealing a blow to the notion that a citizen should be
permitted to maintain a cause of action against a government actor when the
government actor violates that citizen's constitutional rights, the Provens
decision is just is important for what it does not say. For example, two years
later in Painter, the Court recognized that "Provens did not determine whether
a private, common-law cause of action might be available to unclassified public
employees or others asserting violations of constitutional rights for which
existence of possible remedies through administrative channels, in and of themselves,
as adequate to provide Ms. Provens with an opportunity to seek redress. Id. at 963.
Whether or not Ms. Provens advanced a meritorious claim was not addressed.
23 5Bush, 462 U.S. at 367. The plaintiff, a federal aerospace engineer, filed a complaint
against his employer, the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, to recover damages
for an alleged defamation and a retaliatory demotion. Id. at 367. The demotion was
allegedly made following plaintiff's highly critical comments to news media concerning
his employer. Id. The plaintiff grounded his complaint upon a claim that his right to free
speech under the United States Constitution had been violated. Id.
236 provens, 594 N.E.2d at 962.
23 7 d. (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 368).
238 Bush, 462 U.S. at 368.
239 Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 963.
2401d. at 965-66.
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statutory or administrative remedies do not exist."241 Painter determined that
such a cause of action did exist.242
Moreover, Provens acknowledged and reaffirmed the ability of the courts to
create remedies where no remedies have been provided. Notably, however, the
decision did not interpret the Ohio Constitution as a document of independent
force,243 standing alone and apart from other acts of the government. 244 In
interpreting the provisions of the Ohio Constitution, the Court looked to a
federal decision involving the U.S. Constitution.245 As noted above, the federal
system's jurisdiction is controlled by statute, making judicial deference to
legislatively crafted remedies more attractive than in Ohio, where the general
jurisdiction of the courts is not dependent upon the legislature.246 The decision
also fails to acknowledge that it is the court system that is charged with
"preserving the existence' 247 of the rights contained in the constitution. Under
Provens, other governmental bodies are left to decide the fate of citizens
claiming violations of their constitutional rights.
Finally, while not specifically argued, the decision fails to acknowledge the
principle that there shall by a remedy for every wrong.248 Instead of reaffirming
the principle that "[olur courts are open to those who seek remedy for injury
to person, property, or reputation,"249 the court says, in essence, take your
claims of constitutional violations elsewhere.
The Supreme Court's sole modem encounter with the concept of allowing a
remedy for violations of Ohio Constitutional rights does appear to support the
proposition that the courts should use their remedy-crafting power to allow a
cause of action for violations of the Ohio Constitution. While the outcome on
the merits failed to support the idea, the principle behind the holding provides
hope for the cause. In particular, the court acknowledged that it would refrain
from creating new remedies when "other statutory provisions and administra-
24 1Painter, 639 N.E.2d at 54.
2421d.
24 3Arnold, 616 N.E.2d 163 at syllabus.
24 4See Kintz, 124 N.E. at 170. "No General Assembly is above the plain provisions of
the Constitution, and no court, however sacred or powerful, has the right to declare any
public policy thatclearly contravenes ornullifies the rights declared in the Constitution."
Id.
245Bush, 462 U.S. at 367.
246 See supra note 196.
247Arno/d, 616 N.E.2d at 170. The wrongful dismissal of a public employee is a matter
to be decided by administrative agencies such as the State Employment Relations Board.
The preservation of the rights guaranteed to the citizens is a task resting with thejudiciary.
248 See supra notes 85-130 and accompanying text.
249 Hardy, 512 N.E.2d at 628.
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tive procedures provide meaningful remedies."250 The average citizen who is
wrongfully seized and detained has no administrative remedies available to
him, nor does a defendant in a criminal trial where evidence was wrongfully,
illegally, and unconstitutionally obtained. Under the Provens rationale, in the
absence of other remedies, the court would be "entitled" to invoke its remedy-
crafting power to allow a cause of action for violations of those Ohio
Constitutional rights. Taken beyond the context of the Provens lawsuit, any
violation of a right, where there is no corresponding remedy, provides the
opportunity for the courts to create a remedy When coupled with the nature
of rights251 and the "right-to-a-remedy" provision in the Ohio Constitution,252
the courts would seem not only "entitled" to permit the remedy, but would be
bound to do so. Indeed, without any such remedy, any right contained in the
Ohio Constitution would seem nothing more than a wish.253
VI. OVERCOMING THE DEFENSES TO GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSIONS UPON
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS.
There are a number of potential defenses which, if applied and upheld to
situations involving violations of constitutional rights, would prevent the
courts from recognizing a cause of action arising directly from a violation of
the Ohio Constitution. Each must be addressed individually in order to
determine its validity.
A. Governmental Immunity under The Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act
Few would deny that there is something inherently suspicious about a
government which purports to exist within the confines of a constitution and
yet would make itself immune from liability when its conduct strays beyond
those constitutional confines. Any court faced with a claim that it should permit
a cause of action for constitutional violations, absent the legislature's consent,
would no doubt be confronted with the defense of governmental immunity.254
In Ohio, the defense of governmental immunity is established under The
Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act 255 (hereinafter "the Act"). The Act
declares that political subdivisions are not liable for any acts other than those
articulated 256 and establishes numerous defenses to claims brought against a
250 Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 962.
25 1 See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
253 See Ziegler, supra note 73, at 678.
254 See Friesen, supra note 14, at 1289.
255 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02 (Anderson 1989).
256The Act states, in pertinent part, the following:
(A)(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, the functions of political
subdivisions are hereby classified as governmental functions and
proprietary functions. Except as provided in division (B) of this section,
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political subdivision.257 There are several reasons, however, why the Act
should not be used to prevent the courts from recognizing a cause of action
arising from a violation of the Ohio Constitution.
First, as is evidenced by its title, the Act is designed to provide immunity
for tort actions. Through its language, the Act provides immunity for "injury,
death, or loss to persons or property."258 In order to apply to claims for
constitutional violations, the Act would have to be statutorily constructed to
include constitutional violations within the meaning of either the words "loss
to persons" or the word "injury."259 The result of doing so would be to permit
the government to violate, at will, any or all of the provisions in the Bill of
Rights, knowing that its constitutionally abhorrent actions could go unchecked
in the courts. A claim of sovereign immunity for violations of the Constitution
would thus render the Bill of Rights "empty and meaningless 260 given that the
Bill of Rights is designed to "protect individual persons from impermissible
infringements and oppressive violations by government action."261 Also, such
a reading seems implausible given the Ohio Supreme Court's recent strong
defense of the public policies underlying the Bill of Rights.262
Invoking the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act to invalidate a claim for
damages resulting from a constitutional violation also violates the reasoning
behind the "right-to-a- remedy" clause of article one, section sixteen. 263 If the
"right- to-a-remedy" clause means that "our courts are open to those seeking
remedy for injury to person, property, or reputation,"264 then it would seem
that the Act, as invoked to deny a claim for damages arising from a violation
of the constitution, is in direct contradiction with Ohio's right to a remedy
a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury,
death, or loss to persons or property allegedly caused by any act or
omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political
subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.
(emphasis added) R.C. § 2744.02(A)(1)(B) of the act then lists several instances in which
the political subdivision or its employee would be liable for loss or injury. Damage
arising from constitutional violations is not listed. See R.C. § 2744.03(B).
2 57See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.03 (Anderson 1989). For a well articulated
explanation of the Act, see Mackulin v. Lakewood Bd. of Educ., No. 61808, 1993 WL
69555 (Ohio Ct. App. March 11, 1993).
2 58R.C. § 2744.03(A)
2 59See Friesen, supra note 14, at 1294.
2 6OCity of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 873 S.W.2d 425, 442 (Ct. App. Tex. 1993), rev'd, 896
S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1995).
2 61Id.
2 62 Painter, 639 N.E.2d 51. See also supra notes 201-15 and accompanying text.
2 63See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
2 64Hardy, 512 N.E.2d at 628.
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provision.265 Mindful of the fact that the "right-to-a-remedy" clause guarantees
"the right of every citizen... to seek remedy by court action for any injuries
done to him..',,266 the use of the Political Subdivision Liability Act to close
the courthouse doors to those seeking redress for constitutional violations
ignores the nature and existence of a right-a thing to be enforced. 267
Lastly, given the courts' view of the nature of rights and governmental
intrusions upon those rights, it would be illogical to use the tort liability Act to
prevent the recovery of damages for constitutional violations. In an attempt to
protect and further the rights guaranteed in the Ohio Constitution, the Ohio
Supreme Court has held that "governmental action which limits the exercise of
fundamental constitutional rights is subject to highest level of judicial scrutiny.
...,"268 While this scrutiny is usually reserved for legislative acts which infringe
upon the citizen's constitutional rights,269 it is clear that its purpose is to protect
constitutional rights from intrusion by the government.270
Considering the nature of this heightened judicial scrutiny for legislative acts
and the purpose supporting it, it would be logically inconsistent to forbid a
cause of action based upon a violation of a constitutional right simply because
the legislature has cloaked the government with immunity. On the one hand
the court would hold that any act of the legislature which infringes upon a
fundamental right will be closely scrutinized, while on the other hand the court
would hold that any physical act which infringes upon a right guaranteed
under the Ohio Constitution is free from scrutiny because immunity has been
invoked. If the role of the courts is to protect and enforce the rights guaranteed
in the Ohio Constitution, then the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, as
used to bar suits brought for damages as a result of violations of those same
rights, should be held inapplicable. To hold otherwise would be wholly
inconsistent with the nature of Ohio's courts.
B. Actions Brought Against the State Under the Court of Claims Act
The Ohio Revised Code addresses the civil liability of state officers and
employees. It states, in pertinent part:
no officer or employee of the state shall be liable in any civil action that
arises under the law of this state for damage or injury caused in the
performance of his duties, unless the officer's or employee's actions
265Powers, supra note 86, at 613.
266Armstrong, 103 N.E.2d at 769.
267 Ziegler, supra note 73, at 678.
268See Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 511 (Ohio 1994).
2691d. at 507.
27OPrimes v. Tyler, 331 N.E.2d 723, 726 (Ohio 1975)(holding that a statute will be
considered unconstitutional unless it is shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest).
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were manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official
responsibilities .... 271
This section is to be read along with the Court of Claims Act (hereinafter
"Claims Act").272 The Claims Act proclaims that the state273 "hereby waives its
immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its liability
determined, in the court of claims created in this chapter."274 The Claims Act
also provides that the waiver "shall be void if the court [the Court of Claims]
determines that the act or omission was manifestly outside the scope of the
officer's or employee's office or employment...."275 Lastly, the Court of Claims
has exclusive jurisdiction over matters brought against the state.276 The Claims
Act, therefore, requires that any actions brought against a state employee must
be brought through the Court of Claims.
Notably officers and employees of the state are not given immunity for
actions which are manifestly outside the scope of their employment or official
responsibility.277 This waiver is significant in one primary respect: actions of
an unconstitutional nature cannot be said to be within a state actor's scope of
employment or official responsibility because all officers of the state must take
an oath to support the Ohio Constitution.278 One cannot, at the same time,
support and violate the provisions of the Ohio Constitution.
If the state officer was acting under an unconstitutional mandate from his
department or office, then perhaps it could be argued that the officer was acting
within the scope of employment so as to make the state liable under the Claims
Act, even though the actions taken by the officer were ultimately
unconstitutional.
While the Court of Claims Act would require that actions against the State
of Ohio or its officers be brought in the Court of Claims, officers acting in an
unconstitutional manner would no longer be protected by the state's immunity
provisions. A claim for damages against such officers, arising from a violation
of constitutional provisions, would not be barred by the Court of Claims Act.
2 71OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86 (Anderson 1980).
2 72OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (Anderson 1989).
2 73The Ohio Revised Code defines "state" as the "State of Ohio" and excludes political
subdivisions from definition. R.C. § 2743.01(A).
2 74R.C. § 2743.02(A)(1).
275Id.
276OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.03(A)(1). See Cooperman v. University Surgical Ass.,
Inc., 513 N.E.2d 288 (Ohio 1987).
277 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
278 0HIO CONsT. art. XV, § 7.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The time has come for the Ohio Supreme Court to declare that a cause of
action exists against those governmental actors who violate the rights afforded
Ohio's citizens under the Ohio Constitution. The principle that damages
should be awarded citizens whose constitutional rights are violated should be
reaffirmed in the context of modem Ohio.
The Ohio Constitution is a document independent of the United States
Constitution. The protections provided therein ensure that the citizens of Ohio
will be free from tyranny not from the federal government, but from the state
government. To that end, Ohio constitutional provisions and the policies
underlying them should be upheld and reinforced. Holding accountable those
who violate the Constitution will ensure that the Constitution's provisions are
adhered to and re-establish that document as the principle protector of our
rights as Ohio citizens.
The nature of rights demands that remedies exist for their violations. Of what
significance is a right for which there is no remedy? A government whose
employees purport to govern and rule by certain standards articulated within
the Constitution should be made to compensate those who are aggrieved when
it strays from its constitutional confines. If not, what incentive exists to do so?
In addition, the doctrine of self-execution supports judicial creation of
remedies: fundamental constitutional rights are not dependent upon
legislative action for enforcement.
The Ohio Constitution demands that Ohio's citizens have access to the courts
and that there be a "right-to-a-remedy" when one is injured in person,
reputation or property. Allowing a cause of action to arise directly from a
violation of the Ohio Constitution would further both the "right-to-a-remedy"
provision as well as fundamental concepts and policies underlying those rights
contained in Ohio's Bill of Rights. Given the fundamental nature of the rights
protected by the Ohio Constitution, a constitutional violation requires a
remedy as much, if not more, than a damage to reputation or property.
The Painter and Provens decisions show a willingness on the part of the Ohio
Supreme Court to interpret the Ohio Constitution in an ever-expanding way,
providing remedies when the fundamental concepts and rights contained
within its pages are violated. As a document of the people, the Constitution
should afford the people a certain level of protection. Allowing a damage
remedy for constitutional violations would fulfill this principle.
Lastly, the government should not be able to envelop its employees in the
cloak of sovereign immunity to prevent payment of damages when the
employees act in contravention of the mandates of the Ohio Constitution. The
words in the Bill of Rights become hollow without a way to enforce them. A
damages remedy for constitutional violations would reinforce the protections
of the Bill of Rights and when coupled with the inability to invoke sovereign
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immunity, would ensure that the Bill of Rights' protections would be upheld
by those to whom we hand the reigns of government. If the idea worked
one-hundred and fifty years ago in the Jeffries decision, it certainly would work
today.
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